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Government mandates are often used to promote equality in the workplace, often imposing 
additional costs upon employers. Economic theory suggest that these additional costs will be shifted 
onto the employees through a reduction in wages. However, when wage shifting is not an option 
due to anti-discrimination laws, how will employers respond to the additional costs imposed? 
Gruber (1994) found that wage shifting occurs when the groups benefiting from a government 
mandate are easily identifiable to the employer, despite the existence of anti-discrimination laws.  
This study seeks to further the work of Gruber (1994) and examine wage shifting at an 
industry level. We look at industries that have a large percentage of workers who are benefited by 
a government mandate to see if the wage shifting in these industries was more significant. This 
study finds that, as the percentage of workforce receiving benefits increases, the amount of wage 
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The goal of this paper is to replicate and then expand upon the results found in Gruber 
(1994). He showed that when benefits to employees are mandated by the government, the additional 
costs of these benefits are shifted from the company to the employees directly benefiting from the 
mandate through a reduction in wages. The findings if Gruber (1994) address the workplace, and 
neglect to delve deeper into industry analysis. It’s possible that industries that have a higher density 
of workers benefiting from the mandate shift a greater amount of the costs to its employees. This 
study seeks to further the findings in Gruber (1994) and examine them at the industry level.  
Arguments and debates over publicly provided benefits are heard often in the news as 
government officials try to appease voters. In order to appease the voters, and thus increase chances 
of re-election, politicians will pass laws that provide voters with desired benefit, such as health 
insurance. While many people are in favor of governments providing benefits that would otherwise 
be unavailable, the true economic effects are often unknown or misunderstood. One argument 
against publicly financed benefits is that they require the government to increase tax revenue in 
order to fund the program (Summers, 1989). This, in turn, increases the deadweight loss from 
taxation, or less economic activity and slower rates of growth. An alternative to governments 
providing benefits programs is to pass laws mandating that employers provide the desired benefits. 
The advantage to this approach is that it can shift costs from the taxpayers to the owners of private 
firms. Wages can adjust if employees truly value the benefit being mandated, resulting in what is 
essentially a lower tax rate and less dead weight loss (Summers, 1989) 
In a seminal paper, Gruber (1994) examined the efficiency of group-specific mandates by 
exploiting a natural experiment conducted when several states passed laws mandating 
comprehensive maternity insurance coverage. Gruber centered his analysis on three states: Illinois, 
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New Jersey, and New York, all of which had laws mandating comprehensive maternity benefits go 
into effect between July 1, 1976 and January 1, 1977 (Gruber, 1994). This particular type of 
mandate presents an interesting issue: theoretically, if employees value the benefit, they pay for it 
through wage reduction. However, these particular mandates affected an identifiable group, women 
of childbearing age, who are the primary beneficiaries. Economic theory suggests that these 
employees will bear a large part of the cost through decreasing wage offers. However, the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 prohibits employers from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex; 
employers cannot pay a lesser wage based on sex, assuming comparable work and performance 
(The Equal Pay Act of 1963, 2017). When a demographically identifiable group receives benefits, 
would employers attempt to pass the costs of the benefits on to other employees who cannot claim 
them (e.q., men or women beyond childbearing age)?  Gruber concluded group-specific wage 
shifting of the costs of the maternity mandates to the groups most affected by the mandate, despite 
the existence of the Equal Pay Act of 1963. 
There is a large literature on the incidence of mandated benefits. Depew and Bailey (2015) 
show that the ACA’s dependent mandate increased health insurance premiums to employers, but 
they find no discernable differences in employee contributions across plans that should and should 
not be affected. Lahey (2012) found that infertility treatment mandates decrease wages and 
employment of women of child-bearing age. Bailey (2013) found wages decrease following the 
passage of diabetes mandates. 
 Baum (2003) analyzed the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which 
guarantees 12 weeks of unpaid leave for eligible mothers, and how it affected employment and 
wages. Baum hypothesizes some shifting of costs to the group receiving the benefit of the mandate 
will be observed. While the leave is unpaid, the mandate imposes other costs on employers, such 
as: hiring and training temporary replacements, productivity losses because temporary workers 
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have less firm-specific human capital, and the lowering of workplace morale if coworkers are 
required to cover some, or all, of the absent worker’s production. Baum’s empirical analysis finds 
that the legislation had a small and statistically insignificant negative effect on wages.  While theory 
suggests that some shifting should occur, Baum offers several possible explanations for why his 
results do not show significant wage shifting: many firms voluntarily provided maternity leave 
before the law was passed, the duration of the law’s effect is short (12 weeks), because employees 
who claim the benefit are not paid, many women may have to return to the workplace before the 
full 12 weeks is at an end, and some otherwise eligible woman may not take maternity leave because 
they know it will cause promotions and pay increases to be delayed or reduced.  
In a study similar to Baum, Edwards (2006) examined the effects of maternity leave 
legislation on wages in Australia. Edwards finds that nationwide there is a negative wage 
differential between employees who are eligible and those who are ineligible for maternity leave.   
The results of this study are in line with what economic theory suggests: that firms will shift the 
costs of mandates to those who benefit from the mandate.  
In another analysis of employment legislation DeLeire (2000) looks at the effect of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); the ADA, much like maternity legislation, affects an easily 
identifiable group. The ADA mandated that firms provide job accommodations for disabled 
employees. While this may provide employment opportunities for people with disabilities who are 
willing to work, it also imposes costs upon firms who employ disabled workers. DeLeire (2000, p. 
694) states, “An accommodation that increases the productivity of a disabled worker by more than 
its cost would be provided voluntarily by firms. Thus, many accommodations required under the 
ADA represent net costs to firms and may decrease the number of disabled workers these firms 
choose to employ.” The study finds that the ADA led to a 7.2 percentage point reduction in the 
employment of disabled workers relative to their able-bodied counterparts. The mandate was 
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intended to provide workers with disabilities more opportunities for work; however, the increase 
in firms’ compliance costs led to a result that was opposite the original intent of the mandate.  
The purpose of this paper is to build upon the results found in Gruber (1994). In his study 
Gruber looked at the groups of employees that were most affected by states passing maternity 
mandates and found that, on a statewide basis, wages were reduced owing to the increased cost of 
employing the groups receiving the benefits. The paper does not consider that the mandate also 
affected identifiable industries. The change in the cost of providing insurance to an average 
employee would be much greater in industries employing large numbers of benefitting individuals, 
than in industries employing few of the individuals eligible for mandated benefits. Thus, one would 
expect wage adjustments to be significantly smaller in the latter than in the former. This study will 
consider relative wage adjustments across industries on the basis of the compositions of their 
workforces. Intuitively, industries employ high percentages of workers eligible for maternity 
benefits will shift a greater portion of the cost of complying with comprehensive maternity benefits 
to the employees than those industries that employ smaller percentages of eligible workers. 
Workers eligible for maternity benefits are those most likely to have children, and thus require 
maternity coverage on their insurance. These workers are determined by age, sex, and marital 
status: married women ages 20 to 40, single women ages 20-40, and married men ages 20-40 are 









DATA AND MODEL REPLICATION 
The data Gruber (1994) used were taken from the May Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and consist of responses to surveys conducted in the years 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978. The 
experimental states in the study all had passed laws mandating comprehensive maternity benefits 
that went into effect in 1976. Gruber’s study is a “before-and-after” comparison of wages paid prior 
to the mandates (1974-1975) and afterwards (1977-1978); 1976 data does not enter the dataset 
because mandatory maternity benefit policies became effective then. Gruber identifies three 
experimental states—Illinois, New Jersey, and New York—which passed maternity benefit 
mandates in 1976. All three states had maternity mandates in place early enough that the law’s 
effects on wages, if any, would be observed in the 1977 CPS data. The control states in the dataset 
are: Ohio, Indiana, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina. Those states were selected 
because they are located in geographic regions similar to the treated states, allowing Gruber to 
capture and control for any regional shocks to employment or wages. The observations in the final 
dataset include individuals between the ages of 20 and 65. Hourly wages (in 1978 dollars) above 
$100 or below $1 are dropped, as are self-employed persons.  Table 1 presents the means for wage 











Unweighted Means for all Wage Earners 
 Control States Experimental States 
VARIABLES Before Law After Law Before Law After Law 
     
Percentage Female 41.3 43.9 41.2 43.2 
 (49.2) (49.6) (49.2) (49.5) 
     
Age 38.24 37.71 38.87 38.43 
 (12.59) (12.53) (12.54) (12.58) 
     
Percentage Married 75.2 70.9 71.7 68.1 
 (43.2) (45.4) (45.0) (46.6) 
     
Percentage Nonwhite 8.80 9.35 10.4 12.1 
 (28.3) (29.1) (30.5) (32.6) 
     
Education 12.26 12.51 12.56 12.81 
 (2.84) (2.75) (2.90) (2.86) 
     
Average Hourly Wage 5.78 5.69 6.69 6.47 
 (3.69) (3.50) (4.37) (3.77) 
     
Percentage Union 27.3 27.0 33.8 34.3 
 (44.6) (44.4) (47.3) (47.5) 
     
Percentage Manufacturing 36.6 35.2 28.2 26.7 
 (48.2) (47.8) (45.0) (44.2) 
     
Percentage Services 28.7 30.4 34.4 35.5 
 (45.3) (46.0) (47.5) (47.8) 
     
Observations 10,065 10,423 10,854 10,865 
Notes: The numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Any individual with wages below $1/hour and 
above $100/hour are dropped, as were anyone younger than 20 and over 65 or the self-employed. Wages are 
in constant 1978 dollars.  
 
The means are fairly similar across states and time. It is relevant to note that the wages, in 
both experimental and control states, dropped slightly after 1976. The control states had larger 
percentages of workers in manufacturing, while the experimental states had a higher percentage of 
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workers in services. Experimental states also had a higher percentage of workers who were 
members of a union. 
To ensure that this paper accurately builds on the results in Gruber (1994), his empirical 
methods were applied to the above data for purposes of replication. Gruber (1994) employed a 






















DDD Estimates of the Impact of State Mandates on Hourly Wages 











    
Experimental States 1.556 1.520 -0.036 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) 
 [1,433] [1,520]  
    
Non-Experimental States 1.390 1.415 0.025 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
  [1485] [1670]   
    
Location Difference at a point in time: 0.166 0.105  
 (0.016) (0.015)  
    
Difference in difference -0.061  
 (0.022)  
    
B. Control Group: Over 40 and Single Males 20-40:    
    
Experimental States 1.764 1.760 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
 [5,755] [5,623]  
    
Non-Experimental States 1.633 1.636 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
  [5,051] [5,070]   
    
Location Difference at a point in time: 0.131 0.123  
 (0.010) (0.010)  
   
Difference in difference -0.008  
 (0.014)  
    
DDD: -0.053  
 (0.029)  
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The data in this paper returned a DDD estimator of -0.053 (0.029), while Gruber (1994) 
found the DDD estimator to be -0.054 (0.026). This estimator of -0.053 suggests a 5.3% decrease 
in the wages of 20 to 40-year-old married women in experimental states, compared to the change 
in wages in the states that did not pass maternity mandates. These findings show that at least part 
of the costs of mandated maternity benefits are passed to the benefiting group. Overall, the 
replication exercise confirms Gruber’s original results with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
Both Gruber (1994) and Baum (2003) used a three-way interaction term (often referred to 
as difference-in-difference-in-difference) to estimate the wage change following the adoption of 
maternity mandates. The three-way interaction measures the change in wages in a specified 
treatment group; i.e. states passing such legislation, in order to gauge how mandated benefits 
affected a specific group of employees. Gruber’s original model has been expanded to break down 
the effects of maternity mandates by the compositions of an industry’s workforce. Maternity 
mandates are mostly likely to affect working women of childbearing age and their husbands, three 
easily identifiable groups are impacted directly when employers are required to offer such benefits: 
married women ages 20 to 40, single women ages 20 to 40, and married men ages 20 to 40. Each 
of these groups is used as the treatment group in separate regressions. The control group consists 
of workers who, for the most part, are not affected by the mandate: single males ages 20 to 40 and 









The main regression equation used in this paper, an extension of the one used by Guber, is 
given below: 
(1)                        Wijt=β0 + β1Xijt +  β2τt +  β3δj + β4TREATi + β5(δj*τt) + β6(τt*TREATi)
+ β7(δj*TREATi) +  β8(TREATi* τt*δj*θb) +  β9(TREATi* τt*δj*θa) +  eijt 
In this equation W is the log of hourly wages. The subscripts i, j, and t represent the 
individuals, states, and years respectively.  The state-specific index, δj is 1 if treated, 0 otherwise. 
The time index, τt, is set equal to 0 in the years before 1976, 1 for the years after. The Vector 𝑿 
consists of observed individual characteristics. The variable TREAT is a dummy variable for the 
treatment group (1 if in treatment group, 0 if in control group). There are 3 treatment groups will 
be considered: married women ages 20 to 40, single women ages 20 to 40, married men ages 20 to 
40. The DDD estimator is broken down using θa and θb. These are dummy variable determined by 
the percentage of an industry that is made up of female workers, i.e. θa is 1 for all industries where 
females make up greater than 50% of the workforce, while θb is 1 for all industries below 50% 
female workers, 0 otherwise. Multiplying the DDD estimator by θaand θbwill show if industries 
made up of large percentages of female workers experience greater wage shifting than industries 
with smaller percentages of female workers.  
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in the dataset individual characteristics are added 
into the regression in vector 𝑿. The observable individual characteristics included in vector 𝑿 are: 
years of education, experience, the square of experience, a dummy variable for female individuals, 
a dummy variable for married individuals, and interaction of the female and marital status variables, 
a dummy for race that is equal to 1 if the individual is not white, and a dummy for union status. 
Also included in the regression model are controls for 15 major industries, and individual dummies 
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for the years 1974 and 1978. It is expected that years of education, experience, the square of 
experience, marital status, and union status will all have positive effects on wages. Conversely, 
female, race, and the interaction of marital status and female are expected to have negative effects 
on wages. The expected effects are consistent with economic theory and literature.  
The regressions were initially run with the original DDD estimator and do not account for 
the composition of and industry’s workforce. These regressions were run for each of the 3 treatment 
groups. The dependent variable log of weekly hours worked, and employment status were used in 
addition to the log of hourly wages. The results of these initial regressions can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Treatment Group Results -Without Industry Effects 
Treatment Group Log Hourly Wages 
  
Married Women 20-40 -0.0428* 
 (0.0228) 
  
Single Women 20-40 -0.0473* 
 (0.0255) 
  
Married Men 20-40 -0.00444 
 (0.0184) 
  
All Treatments -0.0227 
 (0.0154) 
Notes:  
1. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
2. Coefficient is the third level interaction in the 
regressions found in tables A1 and A2 
3. The control group is all workers over the age of 40 and 
single males ages 20 to 40. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When examining the effect on wages, the third level interaction indicates that married 
females ages 20 to 40 experienced a 4.3% decrease in wages relative to the control group. Similarly, 
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single females ages 20 to 40 experienced a 4.7% decrease in wages relative to the control group. 
Married men did not have a statistically significant change in wages relative to the control group 
in this regression. The other variables in the regressions returned signs consistent with economic 
theory: education, experience, experience squared, marital status, and union status all had positive 
effects on hourly wages. In contrast, female, the interaction of female and marital status, and the 
dummy variable for race all had negative effects on wages. Complete results are given in Table 1 



















The next set of regressions attempt to break down the decreases in wages shown in Table 
3. This is done by breaking the original DDD estimator into two parts, above or below a specified 
percent of female workers in an industry (Appendix Table 2).  
The results in Table 4 show the changes in wages for workers in the treatment groups in 
industries with less than 25% female workers (below break) and for those in industries with more 
than 25% female workers (above break).  
Table 4 
Treatment Group Results – Industry Break at 25 Percent Female Workers 
Treatment Group 
Log Hourly Wages – 
Below Break 
Log Hourly Wages – 
Above Break 
   
Married Women 20-40 0.0825 -0.0471** 
 (0.0666) (0.0228) 
   
Single Women 20-40 0.0773 -0.0508** 
 (0.0583) (0.0256) 
   
Married Men 20-40 0.0876*** -0.0192 
 (0.0262) (0.0186) 
   
All Treatments 0.0616*** -0.0302* 
 (0.0234) (0.0154) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficient shown here are 𝛽15 in the equation 
given above. All regressions returned a 𝑅2 between 0.35 and 0.38. Individual regressions 
results are available.  The Breusch-Pagan test showed that heteroscedasticity was present, this 
was corrected for by running the regressions using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The results in Table 4 show that the treatment groups in industries comprised of relatively 
few female workers did not see a reduction in wages after the passing of maternity mandates. In 
fact, married men, ages 20-40, in industries below 25% female workers, saw an 8.76% increase in 
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wages. All other treatment group in industries below the break saw no statistically significant 
change in wages. It should be noted that although the coefficients are not statistically significant 
the signs on the coefficients are positive. Conversely, the effects of the maternity mandates on the 
treatment groups above the break (industries with more than 25% female workers) are greater than 
those found prior to decomposing the DDD estimator. Married Women ages 20-40, in industries 
above the break, saw a 4.71% decrease in wages. Single Women ages 20-40 saw a 5.08% decrease 
in wages. 
 The regression was run a second time with the industry break at 50% female. Industries 
with less than 50% female workers are considered below the break, and industries with over 50% 
female workers are above the break. 
Table 5  
Treatment Group Results – Industry Break at 50 Percent Female Workers 
Treatment Group 
Log Hourly Wages – 
Below Break 
Log Hourly Wages – 
Above Break 
   
Married Women 20-40 0.0147 -0.0813*** 
 (0.0255) (0.0242) 
   
Single Women 20-40 0.0110 -0.0927*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0277) 
   
Married Men 20-40 0.0329* -0.108*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0233) 
   
All Treatments 0.0171 -0.0748*** 
 (0.0159) (0.0168) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficient shown here is 𝛽15 in the equation 
given above. All regressions returned a 𝑅2 between 0.35 and 0.38. Individual regressions 
results are available.  The Breusch-Pagan test showed that heteroscedasticity was present, this 
was corrected for by running the regressions using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 




 The coefficients in Table 5 suggest that the majority of wage shifting due to maternity 
mandates occurred in industries comprised of more than 50% female workers. The treatment groups 
in industries with less than 50% female workers all returned coefficients with a positive sign, with 
married men ages 20-40 again seeing a statistically significant increase in wages of 3.29%. The 
treatment groups in industries with more than 50% female workers all experiences statistically 
significant decreases in wages. Once again, the magnitude of these decreases in greater than prior 
estimates. In industries with more than 50% female workers married women saw an 8.13% decrease 
in wages, single women saw a 9.27% decrease in wages, and married men experienced a 10.8% 
decrease in wages.  
A third regression puts the break at industries with less than 75% female defined as below 
the break, and industries with more than 75% female above the break.   
Table 6  
Treatment Group Results – Industry Break at 75 Percent Female Workers 
Treatment Group 
Log Hourly Wages – 
Below Break 
Log Hourly Wages – 
Above Break 
   
Married Women 20-40 -0.0536** 0.00633 
 (0.0233) (0.0308) 
   
Single Women 20-40 -0.0523** -0.0199 
 (0.0258) (0.0380) 
   
Married Men 20-40 -3.50e-05 -0.142*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0531) 
   
All Treatments -0.0265* 0.0100 
 (0.0154) (0.0229) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficient shown here is 𝛽15 in the equation 
given above. All regressions returned a 𝑅2 between 0.35 and 0.38. Individual regressions 
results are available.  The Breusch-Pagan test showed that heteroscedasticity was present, this 
was corrected for by running the regressions using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 




 The results of this model in Table 6 are not as telling as the prior models. Three of the 
treatment groups, married women, single women, and the combination of all treatment groups, 
below the break (industries comprised of 75% female workers) saw a statistically significant 
decrease in wages. Meanwhile, only married men ages 20-40 above the break saw a statistically 
significant decrease in wages of 14.2%. The results of this regression are not overly worrying, there 
are only three industries where female workers comprise more than 75% of the workforce: 
hospitals, medical except hospitals, and private household services. It is likely that the small 
number of industries caused the results to be less clear than the previous results. 
 The models show that industries with a relatively low percentage of female workers 
experienced less wage shifting than those with higher percentages of female workers. When the 
DDD estimator was broken down by industries greater than, or less than, 50% female workers the 
results were most telling. All the treatment groups in in this model saw statistically significant 
reductions in wages if they were in industries comprised of more than 50% female workers. Married 
woman ages 20-40 saw an 8.13% decrease in wages, single women ages 20-40 saw a 9.27% 
decrease, married men ages 20-40 saw a 10.8% decrease in wages. Meanwhile, none of the 
treatment groups in industries with less than 50% of the workforce being female saw a statistically 
significant decrease in wages.  
 While the results with industry controls were good, they might be improved upon by further 
analysis. The data from the CPS has 23 major industries, however, the occupations within each 
industry will vary in percentage of workers who are female. The following regressions employ the 
same theoretic model used above, but instead of controlling for the 23 major industries, the density 
of female workers is instead accounted for with 45 occupations that are provided in CPS data (see 
Appendix for table of industry composition). 
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Table 7  
Treatment Group Results -Occupation Break at 25 Percent Female Workers 
Treatment Group 
Log Hourly Wage – 
Below Break 
Log Hourly Wage – 
Above Break 
   
Married Women 20-40 -0.0288 -0.0444* 
 (0.0427) (0.0229) 
   
Single Women 20-40 0.0482 -0.0610** 
 (0.0381) (0.0258) 
   
Married Men 20-40 0.0496*** -0.0938*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0209) 
   
All Treatments 0.0149 -0.0434*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0159) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficient shown here is 𝛽15 in the equation 
given above. All regressions returned a 𝑅2 between 0.35 and 0.38. Individual regressions 
results are available.  The Breusch-Pagan test showed that heteroscedasticity was present, this 
was corrected for by running the regressions using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Table 7 shows that the treatment groups in occupations comprised of relatively few female 
workers did not see a statistically significant reduction in wages after the passing of maternity 
mandates. In fact, married men, ages 20-40, in occupations below 25% female workers, saw an 
4.96% increase in wages. All other treatment group in industries below the break saw no 
statistically significant change in wages. Conversely, the effects of the maternity mandates on the 
treatment groups above the break (occupations with more than 25% female workers) negative and 
statistically significant. Married Women ages 20-40, in occupations above the break, saw a 4.44% 
decrease in wages. Single Women ages 20-40 saw 6.1% decrease in wages. Married men ages 20-





Treatment Group Results – Occupation Break at 50 Percent Female Workers 
Treatment Group 
Log Hourly Wage – 
Below Break 
Log Hourly Wage – 
Above Break 
   
Married Women 20-40 -0.00408 -0.0559** 
 (0.0302) (0.0232) 
   
Single Women 20-40 0.0102 -0.0677*** 
 (0.0318) (0.0262) 
   
Married Men 20-40 0.0251 -0.147*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0238) 
   
All Treatments -0.00170 -0.0462*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The coefficient shown here is 𝛽15 in the equation 
given above. All regressions returned a 𝑅2 between 0.35 and 0.38. Individual regressions 
results are available.  The Breusch-Pagan test showed that heteroscedasticity was present, this 
was corrected for by running the regressions using robust standard errors. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The coefficients in Table 8 suggest that the majority of wage shifting due to maternity 
mandates occurred in occupations comprised of more than 50% female workers. The treatment 
groups in occupations with less than 50% female workers all returned statistically insignificant 
coefficients. The treatment groups in occupations with more than 50% female workers all 
experiences statistically significant decreases in wages. The magnitude of these decreases in greater 
than prior estimates. In occupations with more than 50% female workers married women saw an 
5.59% decrease in wages, single women saw a 6.77% decrease in wages, and married men 






This paper has shown that industries and occupations with a high percentage of workers 
receiving the benefits of a government mandate will experience a greater shifting of that cost to the 
employees via a reduction in wages, than that seen in industries and occupations with a lower 
percentage of benefited workers. Overall, this seems to go along with intuition and economic 
theory: firms with a large number of employees receiving benefits have more incentive to shift the 
cost of those benefits to its employees since its total cost due to the mandate is higher than that of 
a firm with fewer employees who are benefited by the mandate.  
  While this does not prove or disprove the efficacy of government mandates it does show 
that in circumstances where the group receiving the benefit is identifiable, the cost of the mandate 
is still borne, at least in part, by those who receive the benefit. However, the cost of the mandate 
may not be shifted the same across industries or occupations, depending on what percentage of the 
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Table 1: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – No Industry or Occupation Effects 
VARIABLES Married Females Ages 
20-40 
Single Females Ages 
20-40 




     
Education 0.0669*** 0.0648*** 0.0667*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00112) (0.000982) (0.000877) 
Experience 0.0234*** 0.0297*** 0.0333*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000847) (0.000873) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.352*** -0.454*** -0.503*** -0.407*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.241*** -0.280*** -0.308*** -0.243*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00965) 
Married 0.189*** 0.149*** 0.119*** 0.131*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00921) 
Female*Married -0.241*** -0.204*** -0.179*** -0.169*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Nonwhite -0.0483*** -0.0643*** -0.0933*** -0.0648*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.00783) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 0.159*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00409) 
“After” Dummy 0.0193** 0.0171* 0.0180** 0.0178** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00911) (0.00884) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00795) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0688*** 0.0774*** 
 (0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0117) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0101 -0.0123 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment 0.00753 -0.00487 -0.0314** -0.0121 
 (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
0.0277* 0.0522*** 0.00220 0.0182* 
(0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
After*Experimental* 
Treatment 
-0.0428* -0.0473* -0.00444 -0.0227 
(0.0228) (0.0255) (0.0184) (0.0154) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.361 0.370 0.354 0.363 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 







Table 2: Female Workers by Industry 
Industry Total  Females Percent Female 
Mining 165 9 5.45 
Railroads and Railway Express 400 24 6.00 
Construction 2,832 176 6.21 
Forestry and Fisheries 29 6 20.69 
Other Transportation 2,110 455 21.56 
Wholesale Trade 2,496 644 25.80 
Manufacturing Durable Goods 11,148 2,965 26.60 
Other Utilities 1,813 558 30.78 
Public Administration 3,091 963 31.15 
Miscellaneous Services 1,822 660 36.22 
Entertainment 425 163 38.35 
Manufacturing Non-durable Goods 7,305 2,990 40.93 
Agriculture 631 262 41.52 
Other Professional Services 1,334 612 45.88 
Retail Trade 7,622 3,938 51.67 
Finance/Insurance/Real Estate 3,544 1,880 53.05 
Welfare Religious 876 523 59.70 
Education 5,570 3,555 63.82 
Personal, except private household 1,038 678 65.32 
Hospitals 2,647 2,015 76.12 
Medical Except Hospitals 1,537 1,227 79.83 
Never Worked 25,975 21,533 82.90 
Private Household Services 539 493 91.47 













Table 3: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – Industry Break at 25 Percent 
Female Workers  
     
 Married Females Ages 
20-40 






     
Education 0.0669*** 0.0648*** 0.0668*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00112) (0.000983) (0.000877) 
Experience 0.0233*** 0.0296*** 0.0333*** 0.0271*** 
 (0.000847) (0.000874) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.352*** -0.453*** -0.502*** -0.406*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.240*** -0.280*** -0.308*** -0.242*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00965) 
Married 0.190*** 0.149*** 0.119*** 0.131*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00921) 
Married*Female -0.241*** -0.205*** -0.180*** -0.169*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Non-White -0.0481*** -0.0642*** -0.0925*** -0.0642*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.00783) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.145*** 0.158*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00409) 
“After” Dummy 0.0193** 0.0172* 0.0182** 0.0180** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00911) (0.00884) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00795) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0688*** 0.0772*** 
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0116) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0124 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment 0.00753 -0.00487 -0.0313** -0.0121 
 (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
0.0276* 0.0522*** 0.00212 0.0181* 
(0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
DDD* Above Break 
Dummy 
-0.0471** -0.0508** -0.0192 -0.0302* 
(0.0228) (0.0256) (0.0186) (0.0154) 
DDD* Below Break 
Dummy 
0.0825 0.0773 0.0876*** 0.0616*** 
(0.0666) (0.0583) (0.0262) (0.0234) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.361 0.370 0.355 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 4: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – Industry Break at 50 Percent 
Female Workers  
     
 Married Females Ages 
20-40 






     
Education 0.0671*** 0.0649*** 0.0670*** 0.0690*** 
 (0.00109) (0.00112) (0.000982) (0.000878) 
Experience 0.0233*** 0.0295*** 0.0331*** 0.0269*** 
 (0.000847) (0.000873) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.350*** -0.451*** -0.499*** -0.403*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.240*** -0.280*** -0.308*** -0.240*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00965) 
Married 0.190*** 0.149*** 0.120*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00920) 
Married*Female -0.241*** -0.205*** -0.180*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Non-White -0.0476*** -0.0644*** -0.0927*** -0.0642*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.00783) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.145*** 0.159*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00409) 
“After” Dummy 0.0191** 0.0169* 0.0180** 0.0176** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00911) (0.00885) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.101*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00796) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.118*** 0.0683*** 0.0766*** 
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0116) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0130 -0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0124 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment 0.00754 -0.00487 -0.0313** -0.0122 
 (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
0.0275* 0.0522*** 0.00206 0.0180* 
(0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
DDD* Above Break 
Dummy 
-0.0813*** -0.0927*** -0.108*** -0.0748*** 
(0.0242) (0.0277) (0.0233) (0.0168) 
DDD* Below Break 
Dummy 
0.0147 0.0110 0.0329* 0.0171 
(0.0255) (0.0273) (0.0187) (0.0159) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.362 0.371 0.355 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 5: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – Industry Break at 75 Percent 
Female Workers  
     
 Married Females Ages 
20-40 






     
Education 0.0669*** 0.0648*** 0.0667*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00112) (0.000982) (0.000877) 
Experience 0.0234*** 0.0297*** 0.0333*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000847) (0.000873) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.353*** -0.454*** -0.503*** -0.408*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.241*** -0.280*** -0.308*** -0.243*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00965) 
Married 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.119*** 0.131*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00921) 
Married*Female -0.241*** -0.204*** -0.179*** -0.169*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Non-White -0.0488*** -0.0644*** -0.0930*** -0.0652*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00819) (0.00783) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 0.159*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00409) 
“After” Dummy 0.0194** 0.0171* 0.0179** 0.0179** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00911) (0.00884) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00795) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0688*** 0.0775*** 
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0116) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0101 -0.0123 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment -0.0129 -0.00487 -0.0314** -0.0121 
 (0.0112) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
-0.0129 0.0523*** 0.00218 0.0183* 
(0.0112) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
DDD* Above Break 
Dummy 
0.00633 -0.0199 -0.142*** 0.0100 
(0.0308) (0.0380) (0.0531) (0.0229) 
DDD* Below Break 
Dummy 
-0.0536** -0.0523** -3.50e-05 -0.0265* 
(0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0184) (0.0154) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.361 0.370 0.354 0.363 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 6: Female Workers by Occupation 
Industry Total  Females Percent Female 
Carpenters 554 0 0.00 
Mine Workers 47 0 0.00 
Other Construction Craftsman 1,345 6 0.45 
Mechanics--Auto 693 4 0.58 
Nonfarm Labor Construction 463 5 1.08 
Engineers 990 22 2.22 
Metal Craftsmen 534 12 2.25 
Mechanics, Except Auto 1,240 29 2.34 
Machinists & Job Setters 501 12 2.40 
All Others 369 9 2.44 
Drivers & Deliverymen 1,938 132 6.81 
Farmers and Farm Managers 14 1 7.14 
Salaried MGR--Manufacturing 1,214 89 7.33 
Protective Service 1,048 85 8.11 
Foremen 1,264 120 9.49 
Nonfarm Labor All Other 1,217 133 10.93 
All other Craftsmen 1,703 205 12.04 
Physician Dentist Rel. Practitioner 298 44 14.77 
Engineering and Science Techs 650 99 15.23 
Nonfarm Labor Manufacturing 805 142 17.64 
Sales Workers--Other Industries  1,641 296 18.04 
Salaried MGR--Other Industries 4,519 1,078 23.85 
Motor Vehicles & Equipment 430 104 24.19 
Paid Farm Laborers & Foremen 295 78 26.44 
Other Prof--Salaried 3,954 1,251 31.64 
Cleaning Service 1,497 489 32.67 
All Other 1,139 423 37.14 
Other Durable Goods 3,997 1,569 39.25 
Nondurable Goods 3,005 1,770 58.90 
Sales Workers--Retail Trade 1,615 1,016 62.91 
Other Clerical Workers 6,283 4,060 64.62 
Other Prof--Self Empl 3 2 66.67 
Teachers, Except College 2,508 1,701 67.82 
Food Service 2,073 1,505 72.60 
Office Machine Operators 591 440 74.45 
Self-Employed--Other Industries 4 3 75.00 
Personal Service 767 584 76.14 
28 
 
Table 6: Female Workers by Occupation 
Industry Total  Females Percent Female 
Never Worked 25,975 21,533 82.90 
Self-Employed--Retail Trade 12 10 83.33 
Unpaid Family Farm Laborers 161 136 84.47 
Health Workers, Except Practitioners 1,296 1,146 88.43 
Health Service 1,192 1,061 89.01 
Bookkeepers 1,142 1,023 89.58 
Steno, Typist, Secretary 3,503 3,447 98.40 
Private Household Workers 460 455 98.91 


































Table 7: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – Occupation Break at 25 Percent 
Female Workers  
     
 Married Females Ages 
20-40 






     
Education 0.0669*** 0.0647*** 0.0668*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00112) (0.000982) (0.000876) 
Experience 0.0234*** 0.0296*** 0.0331*** 0.0271*** 
 (0.000848) (0.000873) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.352*** -0.454*** -0.500*** -0.405*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.241*** -0.280*** -0.307*** -0.240*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00968) 
Married 0.189*** 0.149*** 0.121*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00921) 
Married*Female -0.241*** -0.205*** -0.181*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Non-White -0.0483*** -0.0638*** -0.0922*** -0.0643*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.00781) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 0.159*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00408) 
“After” Dummy 0.0193** 0.0171* 0.0182** 0.0179** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00910) (0.00884) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00796) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0677*** 0.0765*** 
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0116) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0124 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment 0.00753 -0.00488 -0.0314** -0.0123 
 (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
0.0277* 0.0522*** 0.00215 0.0182* 
(0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
DDD* Above Break 
Dummy 
-0.0444* -0.0610** -0.0938*** -0.0434*** 
(0.0229) (0.0258) (0.0209) (0.0159) 
DDD* Below Break 
Dummy 
-0.0288 0.0482 0.0496*** 0.0149 
(0.0427) (0.0381) (0.0192) (0.0170) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.361 0.370 0.355 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 






Table 8: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – Occupation Break at 50 Percent 
Female Workers  
     
 Married Females Ages 
20-40 






     
Education 0.0669*** 0.0647*** 0.0667*** 0.0686*** 
 (0.00108) (0.00112) (0.000982) (0.000876) 
Experience 0.0233*** 0.0296*** 0.0331*** 0.0271*** 
 (0.000848) (0.000873) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.352*** -0.453*** -0.500*** -0.406*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.240*** -0.280*** -0.307*** -0.240*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00968) 
Married 0.190*** 0.149*** 0.120*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00921) 
Married*Female -0.241*** -0.205*** -0.180*** -0.168*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Non-White -0.0483*** -0.0640*** -0.0919*** -0.0645*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.00782) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.147*** 0.159*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00409) 
“After” Dummy 0.0192** 0.0171* 0.0182** 0.0178** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00910) (0.00884) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00796) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0679*** 0.0766*** 
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0116) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0102 -0.0124 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment 0.00754 -0.00488 -0.0313** -0.0122 
 (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
0.0277* 0.0522*** 0.00216 0.0182* 
(0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
DDD* Above Break 
Dummy 
-0.0559** -0.0677*** -0.147*** -0.0462*** 
(0.0232) (0.0262) (0.0238) (0.0163) 
DDD* Below Break 
Dummy 
-0.00408 0.0102 0.0251 -0.00170 
(0.0302) (0.0318) (0.0187) (0.0163) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.361 0.370 0.355 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 





Table 9: Treatment Group Regressions on Log of Hourly Wages – Occupation Break at 75 Percent 
Female Workers  
     
 Married Females Ages 
20-40 






     
Education 0.0669*** 0.0648*** 0.0667*** 0.0687*** 
 (0.00109) (0.00112) (0.000982) (0.000877) 
Experience 0.0234*** 0.0297*** 0.0333*** 0.0272*** 
 (0.000847) (0.000873) (0.000791) (0.000627) 
Experience Squared -0.353*** -0.454*** -0.503*** -0.408*** 
 (0.0148) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0121) 
Female -0.241*** -0.280*** -0.308*** -0.245*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.00966) 
Married 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.119*** 0.132*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.00921) 
Married*Female -0.241*** -0.204*** -0.180*** -0.170*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0142) (0.0109) 
Non-White -0.0486*** -0.0643*** -0.0930*** -0.0650*** 
 (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.00783) (0.00647) 
Union 0.170*** 0.162*** 0.146*** 0.160*** 
 (0.00519) (0.00535) (0.00457) (0.00409) 
“After” Dummy 0.0195** 0.0172* 0.0179** 0.0181** 
 (0.00932) (0.00940) (0.00911) (0.00884) 
Experimental State 
Dummy 
0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 
(0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00794) (0.00795) 
Treatment Group 0.116*** 0.119*** 0.0687*** 0.0781*** 
(0.0140) (0.0185) (0.0116) (0.00998) 
After*Experimental -0.0129 -0.0113 -0.0101 -0.0123 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) 
After*Treatment 0.00752 -0.00488 -0.0314** -0.0120 
 (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0128) (0.0108) 
Experimental* 
Treatment 
0.0277* 0.0523*** 0.00219 0.0183* 
(0.0165) (0.0189) (0.0128) (0.0109) 
DDD* Above Break 
Dummy 
0.00730 -0.000299 -0.179*** 0.0370** 
(0.0257) (0.0289) (0.0553) (0.0185) 
DDD* Below Break 
Dummy 
-0.0691*** -0.0713*** -0.000230 -0.0368** 
(0.0241) (0.0268) (0.0184) (0.0156) 
     
Observations 28,217 26,313 32,516 43,124 
R-squared 0.361 0.370 0.354 0.364 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
